On Strategic Delegation Equilibrium in Duopoly Market

摘要：

The strategic delegation model under oligopoly competition, as a very important researching framework, gets wide application in recent years. This model studies market equilibrium under conditions of strategic delegation. However, it neglects one basic question, that is, whether and under what conditions can strategic delegation itself emerges as part of the equilibrium outcome.We initiate the notion of strategic delegation equilibrium, investigate all the possible equilibria in a duopoly model when the owners of the firms can choose strategic delegation, and present the conditions for strategic delegation equilibrium. Our study enriches and extends the strategic delegation model under oligopoly competition.

关键词： strategic delegation Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas model strategic delegation equilibrium

作者: Guo Xinshuai Miao Baiqi

作者单位: School of Management, University of Sci.& Tech.of China, Hefei, P.R.China, 230026

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第六届管理学国际会议(Proceedings of ICM2007 the 6th International on Management)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1591-1596

在线出版日期: 2007-08-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）