Policy design on green mining based on principal-agent theory
The effectual incentive policy which can resolve the incentive incompatibility between government and mining enterprise plays a key role in carrying out the green mining. The effect on designing optimal incentive mechanism which is derived from enterprises different risk preferences is analyzed in the condition of linear contract on the basis of the principal-agent model, some suggestions about incentive policy on the enterprise of risk averse are provided. The result shows that the share-cropping is an effective mechanism of incentive and risk sharing.
incentive incompatibility green mining principal-agent theory incentive mechanism risk sharing
LONG Ru-yin LI Ming
School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221008, China
国际会议
重庆
英文
6-9
2006-04-04（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）