The Game Analysis to the Role of Information in Public Sanitation Unexpected Incident Management
This paper analyses the role of information in public sanitation unexpected incident management, for example, the Chinese SARS crisis in 2003year, used evolutionary game theory. In the model, government takes the forcibly intervened management that changes the factor game payoff, so the game equilibrium evolvement happens. The paper educes the dynamic functions that include diffusion phase and convergence phase and will be convergence in the finite time. It analyses the effect that government takes opening information measure in different phases, through made strategy learning barriers endogenously disposed that is the function of the information opening degree. It draws the conclusion that government open information in favor of control the unexpected incident diffusion and accelerating dynamic functions convergence. The paper uses the diffusion and convergence dynamic functions and quantitatively analyzes the decreasing numbers of SARS cases after government taking the opening information measure based on the SARS cases in 2003.
Information evolutionary game public sanitation unexpected incident generalized replicator dynamics
Dehai Liu Libo Qu Kang Feng
Department of Quantitative Economic, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, 116025,China Financial Management Department, Liaoning Information Vocational & Technology College, 111000, China School of Business Administration, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, 116025,China
国际会议
哈尔滨
英文
209-214
2006-09-02（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）