OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGN FOR MULTI-OBJECTIVE DOUBLE AUCTION

摘要：

This paper aims at designing a mechanism for multi-objective double auction, which can clear market, satisfy budget restriction, be incentive compatible and maximize the revenue of both sides of buyer and seller. In virtue of the idea of Myersons mechanism design, this paper first establishes a double auction model that can be regarded as a multi-objective and multi-restrictions optimization problem.By solving this problem, we get the optimal auction mechanism. Further, we make numeral analysis and discuss for the allocation efficiency of this mechanism.

关键词： Double auction mechanism design incentive compatibility allocation efficiency

作者: HONG YIN XIAN-JIA WANG

作者单位: School of Business, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China Systems Engineering Institute, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2006 International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics(IEEE第五届机器学习与控制论坛)

会议地点: 大连

会议语种:英文

页码: 207-212

在线出版日期: 2006-08-13（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）