A Kind of network security behavior model Based on game theory

摘要：

In this paper, we study security interactive behavior between the hacker and the defender, under which an innovated new idea is emphasized. The process of attack and defend is supposed as the n different rational and non-cooperative players under incomplete information,which is accord with n person incomplete information game.When the hackers attack the defender, they attempt to get their satisfied payoff, however, the defenders always hope to get their satisfied payoff, which will form the Nash equilibrium of game theory. The defenders can use the Nash equilibrium point to analysis and asset their security. The defenders can also use The Nash equilibrium as the reference of security investment.

关键词： game theory hacker defender Nash equilibrium

作者: Xia ZhengYou Zhang Shiyong

作者单位: Department of Computer information & technologyFudan University Shanghai 200433

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: Proceedings of The Fourth International Conference on Parallel and Distribyted Computing,Applications and Technologies(第四届并行与分布式计算应用与技术国际会议)

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

页码: 950-954

在线出版日期: 2003-08-27（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）