Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance: An Experimental Study
Supply chain contracting literature traditionally has focused on aligning incentives for economically rational players. Recent work has hypothesized that social preferences, separate from economic incentives, may influence behavior in supply chain transactions. Social preferences refer to intrinsic concerns for the other partys welfare in the case of a positive relationship and intrinsic desires for a higher relative payoff compared with the other partys when status is salient. This article provides experimental evidence that social preferences systematically affect economic decision making in supply chain transactions. Specifically,supply chain parties deviate from the predictions provided by self-interested profitmaximization models, such that relationship preference promotes cooperation, individual performance, and high system efficiency, sustainable over time, whereas status preference induces tough actions and reduces both system efficiency and individual performance.
国际会议
2007 International Conference on Manufacturing & Service Operations Management(2007制造与服务运作管理国际学术会议)
北京
英文
2007-06-18(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)