Optimizing the Customers Forecast in a Forecast-Commitment Contract
We analyze a supply contract that was motivated by a manufacturers desire to provide good customer service in the form of delivery commitments in exchange for reasonableforecasts and a purchase commitment from the customer.Under thisForecast-Commitmentcontract,the customer provides a forecast for a future order along with a guarantee to purchase a portion of it,and in return,the supplier makes a commitment to satisfy some or all of the forecasted order.The supplier pays penalties to the customer for shortfalls of the commitment quantity from the forecast,and for shortfalls of the delivered quantity from the customers final order.These penalties allow for differential service among customers within the same framework.In this paper,we analyze the customers problem of choosing the forecast to submit.We show that this contract achieves coordination or near-coordination of the supply chain in a great majority of instances.We demonstrate that the customers optimal forecast and the suppliers response exhibit systematic patterns that depend upon relationships among key contract parameters.With these insights,we are able to provide guidelines for choosing contract parameters that lead to good performance.
Candace Arai Yano Elizabeth Durango-Cohen
IEOR Dept.and Haas School of Business University of California,Berkeley,CA 94720 USA Stuart School of Business,Illinois Institute of Technology,Chicago,IL 60616,USA
国际会议
2007 International Conference on Manufacturing & Service Operations Management(2007制造与服务运作管理国际学术会议)
北京
英文
2007-06-18（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）