A Model of Revenue Management with Strategic Customers with Varying Information and Assessment Capabilities
We develop a model to add the effect of strategic customer behavior into the traditional revenue management problem. We assume the strategic customers have information on price paths and/or the sellers price formation process, but have no knowledge on the companys private information. Under this assumption, we derive the optimal strategy for these customers. The effect of this strategic behavior on the sellers pricing strategy is formulated and discussed, both in the context of the fashion-like retailers dynamic pricing and the bid-price control for the more complicated network revenue management. Numerical results on the possible revenue loss by mistakenly ignoring the strategic customers behavior will be shown.
国际会议
2007 International Conference on Manufacturing & Service Operations Management(2007制造与服务运作管理国际学术会议)
北京
英文
2007-06-18(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)