Technology Licensing by Royalty with Network Externality
In this paper, we study the technology licensing by means of a royalty in a Cournot-duopoly market with network externality, where one of the firms has a cost-reducing innovation. It is found that if licensing is by means of a royalty, the rate of royalty is no related to the network externality under non-drastic innovation and is negative related to the network externality. The royalty licensing is superior to fixed-fee licensing for the patent-holding firm when non-drastic innovation
Technology Licensing Network Externality Royalty Licensing
PAN Xiaojun
Institute of System Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University Shanghai, P. R. China
国际会议
The Fifth InternationalSymposium on Management of Technology(ISMOT07)(第五届技术与创新管理国际研讨会)
杭州
英文
703-705
2007-06-01(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)