会议专题

The Customization Strategy Decisions by Information Goods Monopolist under Uncertainty of Product Quality

Based on the product-differential spatial model and considering the errors of communication between producer and consumer during customization, this paper discusses how to make decisions when information goods monopolist provides both standard and customized goods, and how to avoid the uncertainty originated from communication errors. The results show that under the market incompletely covered condition, the monopolist can increase his profits by adopting customization. Despite the uncertainty of customization goods quality, monopolist can collect earnests to evade such risk, and then the marginal earnest either decreases or increases in different uncertain level. With the development of technology of information goods customization, there will be a phenomenon of overinvestment in customization.

Information Goods Product Differentiated Customized Uncertainty

ZHANG Yu TANG Xiao-wo

School of Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology, P.R.China, 610054

国际会议

2007 International Conference on Dtrategic Management(2007年战略管理国际会议)

成都

英文

609-616

2007-04-19(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)