ANALYSIS OF EXTERNALITY OPTION PROBLEM UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

摘要：

The externality options are enlargement of the financial options. Its essence is object item investment and policy decision of management. In this paper externality option functions of administrator and enterprise who release pollution are described. The optimization investment policy decision of the externality option has been analyzed under different information conditions. The enterprise of externality options hides the pollution-evaluation level information under asymmetry information. It is a principal-agent problem having the adverse selection. This paper designed that objective function is taken at the biggest mathematical expectation value of investment profit. The optimization control of the state equation is taken at pollution-control cost and pollution-evaluation level. Using maximal principle the found solution scheme of the externality options optimization pollutioncontrol cost and pollution-evaluation level has been derived. Finally, the emulation experiment in the externality options was made. The analysis result of externality options is verified.

关键词： externality options asymmetry information pollution-control cost pollution-evaluation level principal-agent

作者: WANG Li-na

作者单位: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 5th International Conference on e-Engineering & Digital Enterprise Technology(第5届e工程及数字企业国际学术会议)

会议地点: 贵阳

会议语种:英文

页码: 23-27

在线出版日期: 2006-08-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）