The Analyses of Strategic Deterrence Effects Impact on Strategic Alliances Decision-Making Based on Horizontally Differentiated Product Market
In this paper, we used the Salops circular city model to analyze the effect of strategic alliance to the potential entrants enter decision, and the alliance room for the incumbents themselves, under the horizontally differentiated product market. Here we used a three stages game model, and consider the decrease of marginal cost to be the main function of alliance. Whats difference in this paper is that: Strategic alliance may not only have direct profit for the firms, but also have indirect profit for them, which come from deterring the potential entrant. So, the effect of entry deterring enlarges the alliance room of the incumbents.
Strategic alliance Entrance deterring Salops circular model Horizontally differentiated product market
Tiebo Song Wenfeng Cen Liangxing Zhang Xiong Chen
School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, 510640, P.R.China
国际会议
2006 Asia-Pacific Services Computing Conference(IEEE亚太地区服务计算会议)
广州
英文
272-275
2006-12-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）