Stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games
Evolutionary game theory provides an effective mathematical framework for understanding the selective pressures,which affect the strategies” evolution of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts.However,for more realistic situation in which the population is finite and subject to fluctuations,traditional deterministic approaches cannot provide a clear insight.Recently,the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games attract much attention from many scientists in different disciplines because of its great convenience for modeling such stochastic systems.In this paper,we review the analytical derivation of two central quantities,fixation probability and fixation time,in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics for any symmetric 2 × 2 game.For three predominant processes widely adopted in evolutionary game theory,that is,Moran process,pairwise comparison process,and Wright-Fisher process,we then present the approximation of these two quantities under weak selection,respectively.Finally,some applications for stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games are shown in the context of two strategies and multiple strategies.This review may provide a comprehensive insight into stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games in finite populations.
Evolutionary Game Theory Stochastic Dynamics Cooperation Evolution
HUANG Feng CHEN Xiaojie WANG Long
Center for Systems and Control,College of Engineering,Peking University,Beijing,100871,P.R.China School of Mathematical Sciences,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu,611
国内会议
厦门
英文
33-39
2017-11-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）