Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality with Minimum Demand

摘要：

1 IntroductionIn a context where consumers may repeatedly purchase an experience good① but don”t know exactly its true quality, the firm supplying the high-quality product needs to signal that information to potential consumers in the introductory phase.② Examples of such signals are advertising (Nelson, 1974;Schmalensee, 1978; Wiggins and Lane, 1983), and price (Farrell, 1980; Gabor and Granger,1966; Leavitt, 1954; Scitovsky, 1944; Spence, 1974; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991).Three important issues concerning the relationships between quality, price and advertising may therefore arise.

作者: Dawen Meng

会议类型: 国内会议

会议名称: 中国工业经济学会2011年年会

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 244-256

在线出版日期: 2011-11-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）