Analysis of a New Insurance Agent Incentive Mechanism

摘要：

　　Millions of insurance agents have promoted the development of Chinese insurance business,while their aim at the maximized self-interests results in the difficulty in avoiding moral risks.In this context,the insurance agent incentive mechanism is necessary.However,the existing incentive mechanism fails to avoid the agents” moral risks,effectively but may add such risks instead.Hence,we correct the incentive mechanism model and add the loss rate as well as the surrender rate into the mechanism model to make it more effective.

关键词： Insurance agent incentive mechanism loss ratio surrender rate Income Insurance Company moral hazard

作者: YANG Shuang WANG Jiayi

作者单位: Insurance School Central University of Finance and Economics No. 39,South College Road,Haidian District,Beijing 100081,China

会议类型: 国内会议

会议名称: 2014中国保险与风险管理国际年会

会议地点: 深圳

会议语种:英文

页码: 301-313

在线出版日期: 2014-07-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）