Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Uncertainty

摘要：

　　We apply the aggregation property of Identical Shape Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (ISHARA) utility functions to analyze the comparative statics properties of a bargaining model with uncertainty.We identify sucient and necessary conditions under which an in- crease in one”s degree of risk aversion benets/hurts one”s opponent.We apply our model to analyze the problems of bargaining over insur- ance contracts and bargaining over incentive contracts.

关键词： Bargaining the Nash Solution ISHARA Preference Risk Aversion

作者: Sanxi Li Hailin Suny Jianye Yan Xundong Yin

会议类型: 国内会议

会议名称: 第九届中国金融学年会

会议地点: 杭州

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-19

在线出版日期: 2012-10-27（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）