A Network Approach to Stable Cross-Holdings in Oligopoly
This paper considers a model of endogenous bilateral cross-holdings.A notion of pairwise stability for networks is applied to analyze ˉrms” incentives for cross-holdings.Under certain conditions and Cournot competition on the output market,it is shown that monopoly is the only outcome of pairwise stable cross-holdings when there are two ˉrms; a wide range of outcomes is possible when there are three ˉrms,including the triopoly Cournot equilib- rium and the duopoly Cournot equilibrium as special cases; and the Cournot equilibrium is an outcome of pairwise stable cross-holdings when there are four or more ˉrms.Competitive implications of the results are also brie°y discussed.
Antitrust cross-holding Cournot equilibrium network oligopoly pairwise stability
Cheng-Zhong Qin Shengping Zhang Dandan Zhu
Department of Economics,University of California,Santa Barbara,CA 93106-9210 Guanghua School of Management,Peking University
国内会议
成都
英文
1-19
2009-10-31（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）