Fee-for-Service vs. Capitation: Anything You Can Do-I Can Do Better (and Cheaper)

摘要：

This paper recasts the analysis of optimal physician remuneration-generally presented as a contest between prospective (capitation) and retrospective (fee-for-service) schemes - as a problem in price theory.When a patient type is uncertain,or the risk of poor health outcomes depends on preventive care,standard arguments concerning risk bearing are used to prove that fee-for-service can deliver socially-optimal outcomes at a lower cost than a capitation-based system.

作者: Vicky Barham Rose Anne Devlin Olga Milliken

作者单位: Department of Economics University of Ottawa

会议类型: 国内会议

会议名称: 2007年社会主义和谐社会构建与社会保障国际论坛

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 219-245

在线出版日期: 2007-11-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）