Incentive Mechanisms for Network Utility Maximization
In this paper,incentive mechanisms for maximizing network utility is studied.In the considered scenario,the network center intends to implement a solution that maximizes the network utility while the solution may not be optimal for each individual user.Therefore,incentive needs to be provided for the users to motivate them in order to implement the solution that maximizes the network utility.Truthful reporting from users is necessary for the center to determine the incentives and achieve its solution.For two-user and multiuser cases,we propose two mechanisms to motivate truthful reporting from users while guaranteeing nonnegative utility gains for both the users and the center.The proposed mechanisms are proved to be incentive compatible.Simulations are conducted for the D2D application to validate the analytical results and demonstrate the proposed mechanisms.
incentive mechanism network utility maximization truthful local information reporting
Jie Gao Lian Zhao Xuemin(Sherman)Sheny
Dept.Electrical,Biomedical,& Computer Engineering,Ryerson University,Toronto,ON,Canada Dept.Electrical & Computer Engineering,University of Waterloo,Waterloo,ON,Canada
国内会议
上海
英文
276-281
2019-05-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）