The Suppliers Choice with Financial Constraint
When a supplier with financial constraint faces solely demand uncertainty of market, the supplier is likely to refuse to produce any product because risk of the market. From the perspective of stimulating the supplier to enter the market, the supplier can choose a retailer with sufficient capital (model 1)or a retailer with financial constraint (model 2) as his partner to share the risk of market. The supplier makes a contract that needs the retailer preorder. So the supplier can finance from the retailer and transfers inventory risk to the retailer. Based on dynamic game with the supplier being the leader, we demonstrate that both the supplier and the retailers expected profit arc positive in model 1 and model 2 when reaching Nash equilibrium. Under this condition, they are apt to enter inarket. We also compare model 1 and model 2 and analyze respectively. Then we show that the supplier with financial constraint prefers to a retailer with sufficient capital from different angle. Especially, almost all decision variables can be explicitly expressed.
supply chain management game theory preorder financial constraint
Huiyuan Tu Yixue Li Chong Chen Dabin Zhang
Academy of Mathematics and systems Science, Chinese Academy of sciences, Beijing 100080, P.R.china Academy of Mathematics and systems Science, Chinese Academy of sciences, Beijing 100080, P.R.china S Academy of Mathematics and systems Science, Chinese Academy of sciences, Beijing 100080, P.R.china I
国际会议
The First World Congress on Global Optimization in Engineering & Science(第一届工程与科学全局优化国际会议 WCGO2009)
长沙
英文
669-675
2009-06-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）