A Game Analysis between Rural Financial Institutions and Capital Demanders Based on the Interest Equilibrium in China

摘要：

　　In the rural credit market, rural financial institution and capital demanders are game players.This article establishes a game model between rural financial institutions and capital demanders to analyze the selections of rural financial institutions and capital demanders.It finds out that interest rate, transaction costs and returns of rural projects are key to approving the loans to rural financial institutions while the inaccurate expect will bring loss to them.Based on the results of game analysis, this paper puts forward the suggestion that different-level loan guarantee system will improve the efficiency of rural financing in China.

关键词： Rural financial institution Finitely repeated game Infinitely repeated game Capital demanders

作者: WEN Hong-mei CHANG Jing XIU Hong-yan

作者单位: School of Finance,Harbin University of Commerce,Harbin,P.R.China,150028

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2013 International Conference on Public Administration (9th)(2013年第九届公共管理国际会议)

会议地点: 南非

会议语种:英文

页码: 1008-1015

在线出版日期: 2013-10-31（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）