Economic Coercion,Chinese Style:A Theory of Ambiguity in Chinas Trade Diplomacy
As China becomes a major trading nation with growing market power in the world economy, it also means that China will start having more economic policy instruments at its disposal to serve its foreign policy goals.While this is by no means new to the field of international political economy since the literature of economic statecraft starting from Hirschman (1945) has long recognized how the asymmetry in trade relationship gives rise to political gains for hrger states, the way in which China exercises its newly-gained economic muscle, however, still poses a certain concern over whether the conventional wisdom can help us understand its behavior well.This paper provides a domestic exphnation for the ambiguity in Chinas trade diplomacy.The main thrust of the argument is that given the competition between factions, it pays for the incumbent faction to increase ambiguity in their policy in order to enlarge their support base.This idea helps us solve the puzzle for why China almost never makes it clear how exactly it is going to capitalize on its newly-gained economic and military muscle.
Hans Tung
National Taiwan University
国际会议
The 1st Chinese Conference on Comparative Political Economy (第一届比较政治经济学国际学术会议)
北京
英文
70-84
2013-09-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）