Sovereign Default:Time Horizon,Political Regime,and Vulnerability to Global Shocks

摘要：

　　The mixed evidence about democratic advantage in quantitative studies of sovereign creditworthiness, suggests that the e_ect of regime type on sovereign default is likely to be non linear, conditional, or embedded in internal or external contexts.Because anocracy is a transitional regime by nature, regime duration a_ects time horizons ofanocratic governments in a different way from full democracies and stark autocracies.Based on Olsons theory about the regime-dependente_ect of regime age, this paper suggests a nonlinear relationship between regime duration and sovereign default conditional on regime type.Because sovereign debt crises are largely triggered by international shocks, controlling for common shocks is necessary and important for improving empirical analysis on the relationship among regime type, regime duration, and sovereign default.In the present paper, I propose an autoregressive hierarchical model with multifactor residuals and analyze data of 134 countries from 1990 to 2003.A Markov China Monte Carlo simulation algorithm is designed and applied to estimate and compare competing models.Empirical _ndings suggest that the e_ect of regime age heavily depends on regime type.Anocratic governments have shorter time horizons with increasing regime age, but governments of nonanocracies expect higher likelihood of regime survival with a longer regime history.

关键词： Sovereign Default Regime Type Regime Duration Globalization Bayesian Multilevel Model

作者: PANG Xun

作者单位: Tsinghua University

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 1st Chinese Conference on Comparative Political Economy (第一届比较政治经济学国际学术会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 336-369

在线出版日期: 2013-09-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）