Supply Chain Coordination Based on Revenue-sharing Contracts under Random Demand

摘要：

　　To a two-echelon supply chain system consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer under random demand,the game models about decentralized decision and centralized decision are constructed in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower.The retailers optimal purchasing strategies about two conditions above are given and the supply chain expected total profits under unique purchasing strategies of the retailer are compared with.Then the relations of supply chain expected total profit between with applying the revenue-sharing contracts situation and with the centralized decision situation are discussed.And the conditions to realize the supply chain perfect coordinating are defined.Finally,numerical analysis shows that applying the revenue-sharing contract in the decentralized supply chain could not only achieve the maximal overall expected performance but also allow both parties to benefit from it.

关键词： supply chain coordination revenue-sharing random demand

作者: Rongshuang Ma Jinyu Ren Yongping Hao

作者单位: School of Mechanical Engineering, Shenyang Ligong University, 110159, China School of Mechanical Engineering, Shenyang Ligong University, 110159, China;School of Mechanical Eng

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: the Second International Conference on Frontiers of Manufacturing and Design Science(第二届制造与设计科学国际会议(ICFMD 2011))

会议地点: 台湾

会议语种:英文

页码: 4801-4805

在线出版日期: 2011-12-11（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）