An Empirical Study on the Agency Risk of Executives in the Family Holding Public Company
More and more family holding companies become the public companies in recent years. The problem of executives agency risk is an important factor which influences their rapid development This article tries to do the exploratory research of evaluating the agency risk of executives. At first this article makes an in-deep analysis on the indices of executive agency risk in family holding public companies based on executives devotion and encroachment. Then model is established with the operation of logistic regression. In the end the article made recommendations about preventing the agency risk of executives.
agency risk executives family holding
XIN Jinguo WEI Tingting
School of Economics Hangzhou Diaiizi University Hangzhou. China School of Accounting Hangzhou Dianzi University Hangzhou. China
国际会议
昆明、丽江
英文
410-413
2011-04-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）