Evolution Analysis and Survival Condition for Altruistic Behaviors in Evolutionary Game

摘要：

Group selection is often cited as an explanation for the survival of altruistic behaviors.The evolutionarydynamic model of altruistic behaviors is establishedand analyzed The sufficient and necessary conditionfor the survival of altruistic behaviors is obtained andproved.Although in a single interaction the altruist isat a disadvantageous position compared with theegoist,altruistic behaviors can survive in the repeatedgame if the payoff is high enough.This conclusion isuseful for the analysis of group mechanism under theframework,of evolutionary game theory.

作者: Qi Xiang Zhao Yong

作者单位: Institute of Systems Engineering,Huazhong University of Sci.& Tech.,Wuhan 430074,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2008 3rd International Conference on Intelligent System and Knowledge Engineering(第三届智能系统与知识工程国际会议)(ISKE 2008)

会议地点: 厦门

会议语种:英文

页码: 560-564

在线出版日期: 2008-11-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）